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MERCK KGAA v. INTEGRA
LIFESCIENCES I, LTD.: GREATER
RESEARCH PROTECTION FOR
DRUG MANUFACTURERS
SAMUEL RUBIN*

In Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd.,1 Merck KGaA
(Merck) sought protection under a statutory exemption2 from claims
of patent infringement brought by Integra Lifesciences.3 The Supreme
Court addressed whether the use of patented inventions during
preclinical research infringed the patent-holders’ rights if the results
were not submitted to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).4
The Court held unanimously that a statutory safe-harbor provision
contained in 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) “extend[ed] to all uses of patented
inventions that are reasonably related to the development and
submission of any information under the [Federal, Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act].”5 The Court’s interpretation of the safe-harbor
provision broadened protection for those engaged in drug research at
a substantial cost to patent-holders.
I. BACKGROUND
In 1988, Merck began funding research conducted by Dr. David A.
Cheresh at the Scripps Research Institute.6 Dr. Cheresh discovered
that certain arginine-glycine-aspartate (RGD) peptides were an
effective angiogenesis inhibiter. Angiogenesis, the process by which

* 2006 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law.
1. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. ___ (2005); 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005).
2. Hatch-Waxman Act, 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (1994).
3. Respondents and the Burnham Institute co-owned the patented material peptides.
Merck, 125 S. Ct. at 2377.
4. Id. at 2376.
5. Id. at 2380 (citing Eli Lilly v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 665–69 (1990)).
6. Both the Scripps Institute and Dr. Cheresh were dismissed from the initial patent
infringement suit. Id.
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new blood vessels sprout from existing blood vessels, plays a critical
8
role in the spread of disease. Dr. Cheresh succeeded in reversing
tumor growth in chicken embryos by using RGD peptides that were
9
patented by Integra but provided to him by Merck.
In 1995, Merck entered into an agreement with Dr. Cheresh and
Scripps to fund further testing of the patented RGD peptides. The
research was designed to identify the most promising candidate for
submission of an investigational new drug (“IND”) application to the
FDA; however, some of the research on patented peptides would not
result in the submission of the IND application. From 1995 to 1998,
Dr. Cheresh conducted experiments on the RGD peptides provided
by Merck.
Integra sought to license the patented RGD peptides to Merck
until negotiations broke off in the spring of 1996.10 In November of
that year, Merck began to push its peptides through the regulatory
process, and it shared its research with the National Cancer Institute,
which agreed to sponsor clinical trials.11 In July 1996, Integra sued
Merck, Scripps, and Dr. Cheresh for patent infringement in the
Southern District of California. Integra sought damages from Merck
for providing the patented peptides and an injunction to stop both Dr.
Cheresh and Scripps from using the patented peptides to conduct
further angiogenesis research.12 Merck denied infringement and
invoked protection under both Section 271(e)(1) and a common-law
research exemption to patent infringement claims.13

II. BROADENING THE SAFE-HARBOR PROVISION OF SECTION
271(E)(1)
Section 271(e)(1) provides that “[i]t shall not be an act of
infringement to . . . use . . . a patented invention . . . solely for uses

7. Id. at 2378.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
11. Merck, 125 S. Ct. at 2379.
12. Id. The suits against Dr. Cheresh and Scripps were dismissed by the District Court on
post-trial motion. Id. at 2380.
13. Id. at 2379. The opinion is limited to discussion of Section 271(e)(1). The district court
found that the common-law research exemption barred claims of infringement for pre-1995
research, but questions of fact remained as to whether Section 271(e)(1) barred claims for post1995 research.
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reasonably related to the development and submission of information
14
under a Federal law which regulates the . . . use . . . of drugs.”
Although the Federal Circuit found that the Section 271(e)(1) safe
harbor applied only to clinical testing that was absolutely necessary to
supply required information to the FDA, the Supreme Court held that
“[Section] 271(e)(1)’s exemption from infringement extends to all
uses of patented inventions that are reasonably related to the
development and submission of any information under the [Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act].”15
The Court concluded that Section 271(e)(1) “necessarily” included
preclinical study of patented compounds as long as the studies were
“appropriate” steps in preparing an IND application.16 The Court
reasoned that limiting application to clinical trials would effectively
limit application of the safe-harbor provision to submissions to the
FDA of abbreviated new drug applications (ANDAs) for generic
drugs already approved for market, because those would be the only
drugs that could possibly already be in clinical trials.17 Such a limited
reading of the statute was seemingly foreclosed by Eli Lilly & Co. v.
Medtronic, Inc., in which the Supreme Court determined that Section
271(e)(1) applied to all inventions, not drug-related inventions alone.18
Despite its concession that Section 271(e)(1) applied to drugs in
preclinical as well as clinical trials, Integra nevertheless argued that
protection should not extend to preclinical studies relating to the
19
drug’s efficacy, mechanism of action, or pharmacokinetics. In fact,
Integra sought to narrow the safe-harbor provision to preclinical
research to determine the safety of the drug in humans, arguing that
safety is the only data the FDA is—or should be—interested in when
14. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).
15. Merck, 125 S. Ct. at 2380 (citing Eli Lilly v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 665–69
(1990)) (emphasis in original).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 2383 (“Thus, to construe 271(e)(1), as the Court of Appeals did . . . is effectively
to limit assurance of the exemption to the activities necessary to seek approval of a generic
drug.”).
18. Eli Lilly v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 665 (1990); see also Tanuja V. Garde,
Supporting Innovation in Targeted Treatments: Licenses of Right to NIH-Funded Research
Tools, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 249, 264 (2005) (stating that the Supreme Court
possibly granted certiorari in Merck because the Federal Circuit’s limited construction of
Section 271(e)(1) “arguably conflict[ed] with the Supreme Court’s decision in Eli Lilly & Co. v.
Medtronic, Inc., which held that the statutory exemption is not limited to generic drugs but also
covers medical devices”).
19. Merck, 125 S. Ct. at 2381.
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an IND is submitted. The Supreme Court rejected these arguments,
finding that though safety is the primary concern of the FDA, it is not
its only concern.21

III. IMPACT AND CONCLUSION
Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. broadened the
application of Section 271(e)(1) with respect to: (i) the phase of the
research, (ii) the scope of the research, and (iii) the result of the
research. After Merck, the safe-harbor provision can be used to shield
drug manufacturers from liability for (i) using patented materials
both before and after clinical trials have been approved by the FDA,
(ii) conducting research beyond issues pertaining to human safety, and
(iii) failing to submit an IND to the FDA on research that used the
patented compounds.22 The case reflected a pro-development and
concomitant anti-property-right policy, acknowledging that in reality,
scientific testing is a process of “trial and error,” and the safety of
proposed clinical experiments cannot be evaluated “in a vacuum.”23
Merck has already had an impact on pending patent litigation, and
it is likely to affect the future of research exemptions. As a result of
the decision, drug companies will be able to conduct research on
patented inventions free from threat of liability for infringement
reasonably related to submission to the FDA. In fact, some have
suggested this will foster greater efficiency in the drug industry.24
Aside from the effect Merck will have on pending patent litigation,
the expansive scope of the new formulation reaches back to
encompass the infant stages of research. As such, the decision in
Merck weakens protection for so-called research tools, which are

20. Id.
21. Integra also argued that Merck should be denied protection under Section 271(e)(1) for
failure to comply with FDA’s “good laboratory practices.” Id. at 2380. The Court rejected this
argument, noting that “good laboratory practice” rules apply only to safety and not to
preclinical studies of a drug’s efficacy. Id. Moreover, the Court stated that Merck’s noncompliance with “good laboratory practice” would not necessarily preclude submission of an
IND to the FDA. Id.
22. See, e.g., Dennis Crouch, Merck v. Integra: Supreme Court Reverses, Broadens Statutory
Experimental Use Safe Harbor, PATENTLY-O: PATENT LAW BLOG, June 14, 2005; see also Yann
Joly, Integra v. Merck: The Resurrection of the American Research Exemption?, CENTRE FOR
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICY, June 2005, available at http://www.cipp.mcgill.ca/db/news/
00000025.pdf.
23. Merck, 125 S. Ct. at 2381.
24. Joly, supra note 22, at 3.
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products or methods “whose purpose is use in the conduct of
25
research.”
In the five months since the Supreme Court decided Merck,
several courts have grappled with its impact on pending litigation. In
26
Classen v. Biogen, a federal district court applied Merck to dismiss
claims of patent infringement against drug manufacturers for
27
However, the
conducting research on patented inventions.
broadened interpretation is not limitless. Decisions in the wake of
Merck have required something more than “a remote desire to obtain
FDA approval for products [as] sufficient to satisfy the ‘reasonably
related standard.’”28
Another criticism of the broad application of Section 271(e)(1)
suggests that the majority did not give adequate attention to the
“solely for uses reasonably related to submission under a Federal law”
language contained in the text of Section 271(e)(1).29 For instance, the
30
court in Third Wave Technologies, Inc. v. Stratagene focused on the
word “solely” when it noted that partial desire to submit to the FDA
was an insufficient ground for invocation of the Section 271(e)(1)
exemption.31
Merck not only broadened protection for drug manufacturers
under Section 271(e)(1), it will likely also affect the law of research
exemptions by providing decreased protection to holders of research
tool patents. Although the Court in Merck expressly avoided the
research-tool exemption issue, application of the safe-harbor
provision to pre-clinical trials allows the provision to reach back much
farther than the Federal Court’s interpretation of the exemption
32
would have.

25. Integra Lifesciences v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Newman, J.
dissenting) corrected by 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 27796, *50 (July 10, 2003).
26. Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 381 F. Supp. 2d 452 (D. Md. 2005).
27. Id. at 455-56.
28. Third Wave Techs., Inc. v. Stratagene Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 891, 913 (D. Wis. 2005).
29. See Lawrence Ebert, One Response to Merck v. Integra, Sept. 25, 2005, available at
http://madisonian.net/archives/2005/06/14/merck-v-integra/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2005)
(“Although a strict constructionist, Justice Scalia did not analyze the word ‘solely’ in 271(e)(1).
However, by allowing that the jury instruction in Merck v. Integra was not inconsistent with the
Supreme Court decision, Justice Scalia generated a mechanism to re-introduce ‘solely.’”).
30. Third Wave Techs., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 2d at 913.
31. See id. (finding testimony from CEO that testing was “motivated ‘in part’ by a desire to
obtain FDA approval” insufficient grounds to invoke protection under Section 271(e)(1)).
32. Merck, 125 S. Ct. at 2382 n.7.
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One critic has even suggested that broadening of the statutory
provision in Merck demonstrates favoritism towards the protection of
33
research within the drug industry above other industries. In this
regard, the statutory exception is a revitalization of research
protection for drug manufacturers who lost the common law
exception in Madey v. Duke University.34 In Madey, the Federal
Circuit significantly narrowed the common-law experimental-use
exemption to include only those acts that are “solely for amusement,
to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry.”35 After
Madey, if the infringer’s act can be said to be “in furtherance of the
infringer’s legitimate business purpose,” the act is not protected under
the common-law experimental-use exemption.36
There is widespread agreement that the Supreme Court has made
the status of research tool patents unclear.37 Practitioners agree that
by avoiding the issue of a research tool patent exemption in Merck,
the Court invited future litigation on the precise issue of whether
271(e)(1) exempts use of patented research tools from patent
infringement.38 Irving N. Feit, a patent specialist, has noted that use of
the words “patented invention” and specific exclusion from protection
of animal and veterinary products in Section 271(e)(1) suggests that
there is no indication that the Court will treat research tool patents as
39
a separate class of inventions. Although the Court’s decision in
Merck leaves the door open for future litigation as to the precise
impact Section 271(e)(1) will have on research exemptions, Merck

33. Garde, supra note 18, at 266 (“[B]roadening the statutory exemption while at the same
time leaving the common-law experimental use exemption in its limited form suggests that only
in the drug development industry is research more important than patent rights on other
technologies, including, possibly even research tools.”).
34. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 958 (2003);
see also Joly, supra, note 22, at 3.
35. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362.
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Garde, supra note 18, at 262 (“By [‘failing to differentiate between
experimenting on and experimenting with patented technology’] the availability of the
exemption is now uncertain for research tools”); Crouch, supra note 22 (“Rather than settling
the law the Court appears to have created an unfortunate uncertainty regarding the value of
patents covering research tools.”); Irving N. Feit, The Safe Harbor Infringement Exemption
Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, Finally Defined, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TODAY, Aug. 2005,
at 28, available at http://www.iptoday.com/pdf_current/Feit_Proof%203.pdf. (“It is not clear
what effect the Supreme Court’s ambivalence will have on the strong endorsement of research
tool patents made by the Federal Circuit’s Integra v. Merck decision.”).
38. See, e.g., Crouch, supra note 22; Feit, supra note 37, at 28.
39. Feit, supra note 37, at 28.
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marks a commitment by the Court to a policy of broadening
protection in drug research and development, even at a substantial
cost to patent-holders.

